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Abstract 
 
This study investigates the market structure of banking industry in Malaysia from 1996–2009, using the k- 
bank concentration ratio (CRk) and the Herﬁndahl Hirschman Index (HHI). It also evaluates the monopoly 
of banks over the fourteen years’ period using the ‘H-statistic’, Panzar-Rosse approach. The k- 
concentration ratio showed Malaysia was moderately concentrated market, moving to a less concentrated 
one. Meanwhile, the Herfindahl Hirschman Index result showed a constant concentration ratio throughout 
the period. The Panzar-Rosse H-statistics suggested that banks in Malaysia were operating under 
monopolistic competition based on total interest income and total revenue as the dependent variables. In 
the long-run equilibrium, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics suggested that Malaysian banks were operating 
under perfect competition. The findings of this study highlight the importance of size, efficient risk 
management and liquidity in sustaining long run revenue and competition. In order to compete in the next 
era of globalization, an ongoing investment in technological aspects related to banking products and 
services should be one of the essential policies for the banks to prosper. 
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and Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 
1.0      Introduction 
 
In the banking world today, financial institutions offer a greater variety of products and services in 
order to diversify their business. Not only these institutions offer loans such as term deposits but they also 
offer other banking products related to risk management, investments and retirement plans. As a result, 
their services overlap and competition between the institutions increased. 
 
The advancement in technology has also changed the banking environment. The internet has 
promoted more intense competition among financial institutions. Institutions offering online banking 
services can reduce costs, increase efficiency and intensify the banking competition. The use of internet 
also has made it possible for non-banking institutions to compete with securities firms by conducting 
security offerings online and selling directly to investors. Internet has, indirectly, forced banking 
institutions to offer more competitive services to the consumers. 
 
Regardless of the level or the competitiveness of the environment, a commercial bank’s 
performance needs to be monitored closely. A commercial bank is monitored for various reasons. From an 
early detection of slow growth in their performance, the bank regulators can identify banks that are 
experiencing problems so that they could be remedied. In addition, commercial banks also evaluate their 
own performance over time to determine the outcomes of previous management decision so that changes 
can be made where appropriate. In the Asian region, almost all countries are affected during the late 1997 
financial crisis. Some banks in Indonesia and Thailand had to be closed, unable to stand the financial 
turmoil.   Thus, assessing the performance of commercial banks is important. Without consistent 
monitoring, existing problems may go unnoticed and may cripple the institution’s growth in the future. 
The scope of performance measurement varies and can be from the profit, productivity, efficiency, market 
power as well as the level of the institution’s competitiveness. 
 
2.0      Competition  and Concentration: Why it matters? 
 
Fritzer (2004) defined concentration of banks as the ratio of a country’s three largest bank’s assets 
to the country’s total banking sector assets. A highly concentrated banking sector may lead to lack of 
competition whereas fragmented banking markets may suffer from undercapitalized banks. Fragmented 
banking markets are thus at a higher risk to suffer from financial market shocks. However, both high 
concentrated and overly-fragmented banking sectors may have negative effects on efficiency and growth 
as well as financial stability. 
 
A highly concentrated banking sector is deemed important for any economy as it may enhance the 
economic growth. Highly concentrated banking sector has stronger resistance to financial crises as large 
banks in the sector tend to spread their activities geographically (Fritzer, 2004). Banking sector 
concentration can also be expected to have a positive effect on bank lending. Due to its level of 
concentration, the sector is able to take advantage of economies of scale especially in the production of 
banking services by consolidating the output of different banks. This in return, may lead to banks having 
higher market share with a superior cost structure. Concentration ratios, which are based on the fraction of 
the banking market served by the largest four or five banks in the country, are often used as a proxy to 
measure competitiveness. 
 
According to  Staikourus  (2010), the  degree  of  banking competition  and  its association  with 
market concentration, seem to contrast each other. If we accept the theoretical proposition , then, a more 
concentrated market implies a lower degree of competition due to undesirable exercise of market power 
by banks. Based on other theory, for instance, the contestability theory1, it highlights that under particular 
conditions,  competition  and  concentration  can  coexist.  The  theory  of  contestability  (Baumol,  1982; 
Baumol et.al., 1982) assumes that firms can enter or leave rapidly any market without losing their capital 
and that potential competitors possess the same cost functions as firms that already serve in the market. 
These characteristics imply that in the contestable market the threat of potential entry constrains firms to 
price their products competitively. If these conditions are met, then external conditions will dominate 
internal conditions and guarantee non-collusive behaviour within that market. 
 
On the other hand, a more concentrated system, in as much as it implies the presence of a few 
relatively large banks, is more likely to display a “too big to fail” problem by which large banks increase 
their risk exposure anticipating the unwillingness of the regulator to let the bank fail in the event of 
insolvency problems (Hughes and Mester, 1998). 
 
Another reported reason for bank failures is increased competition. By studying the level of 
competition in the banking industry, it can shed some light, if any, on the sign of bank poor performances. 
Deregulation has made the banking industry more competitive. When banks offer more competitive rates 
on deposits and loans, the result is a reduced net interest margin, and possibly failure, if the margin is not 
large  enough  to  cover  other  noninterest  expenses  and  loan  losses.  A  review  by  The  Office  of  the 
Controller of the Currency in the United States found that 81 percent out of the 162 failed banks since 
1979 were due to not having a loan policy or did not closely follow their loan policy. In addition, 59 
percent of these banks did not use an adequate system for identifying problem loans. From this, it can be 
deducted that banks can fail not only due to the economic environment but also due to their inadequate 
management. 
 
A competitive banking market may result in more benefits to the society as a whole, such as lower 
prices and higher quality of financial products (Boyd and Nicolo, 2005), but on the other hand its 
influennce on the financial stability is not conclusive according tothe literature. There are two main rival 
theories on this matter. Some papers find that competition, in fact, enhances bank risk-taking behavior, 
since it pressures banks to operate with a minimum capital buffer (Hellman et al., 2000; Allen and Gale, 
2004). Others defend the contrary by stating that crises are less likely to happen in competitive banking 
systems (Beck et al., 2006; Boyd and Nicolo, 2005). 
 
The landscape of Asian banking has shifted rapidly in the last decade and it will continue to do so. 
Asian  countries  provide  growth  opportunities  that  are  unlikely  to  be  matched  by  maturing  banking 
markets around the world (Bowers et al., 2003). Aside from Singapore, Korea and Japan, most Asian 
economies are marked by a wide disparity of income. In many of them, the gap is growing, resulting the 
formation of narrow segment of affluent customers who are the main drivers of the new banking 
opportunities. 
 
3.0 Objectives of the Study 
 
This study seeks to evaluate the degree of competition in the Malaysian banking sector. This study 
also aims to test the market power in Malaysian banking sectors using the concentration ratio and 
Herfindahl Hirschman Index. It will estimate the competitive level for Malaysian, banks. 
 
Specific objectives of this study are: 
 
i. To assess the k-concentration ratio conditions in Malaysia 
ii. To analyze the market power conditions of Malaysian banking industries using the Herfindahl- 
Hirschman Index. 
iii. To  examine  the  competition  conditions  and  their  determinants  of  the  banking  industries  in 
Malaysia using the Panzar-Rosse method. 
 
4.0 Theoretical Framework 
 
Neoclassical economics is a general approach in economics focusing on the determination of 
prices, outputs and income distributions in markets through supply and demand. These are mediated 
through a hypothesized maximization of income-constrained utility by individuals and of cost-constrained 
profits of firms employing available information and factors of production. The neoclassical theory of the 
firm portrays the marginal cost curve and the average cost curve as distinctly U-shaped.  Princeton’s 
William Baumol has developed the notion of a contestable market, which means a market in which firm 
entry and exit are costless and veritually so. Contestability is a measure of the extent to which a market is 
open to new entry and where the competitive pricing can be observed. The contestable markets approach 
to competition represents an alternative to the neo-classical theory of the firm. 
 
Contestability became prominent in the early 1980s, largely through the work of the American 
economist William Baumol (1982). Baumol defined contestable markets as existing market where “an 
entrant has access to all production techniques available to the incumbents, is not prohibited from wooing 
the incumbent’s customers, and entry decisions can be reversed without cost.” 
There are three main conditions for pure market contestability which include perfect information 
and the ability and/or the rights of all suppliers to make use of the best available production technology in 
the market, the freedom to market/advertise and enter a market with a competing product and the absence 
of sunk costs which reduces the risks of coming into a market. 
 
One of the contestable market fundamental features is low barriers to entry
1 
and exit. A perfectly 
contestable market would have no barriers to entry or exit so that there is always the potential for new 
suppliers to come into a market to provide fresh competition to existing suppliers. If a firm in a market 
with no entry or exit barriers raise its prices above marginal cost and begin to earn abnormal profits, 
potential rivals will enter the market to take advantage of these profits. When the incumbent firm(s) 
responds by returning prices to levels consistent with normal profits, the new firms will exit. In this 
manner even a single-firm market can show highly competitive behavior. At the extreme, a market with 
no barriers to entry or exit is perfectly contestable. For a perfectly contestable market, entry into and exit 
out of the market must be costless. Considerable criticism surrounds this theory because there are often 
large entry and exit costs associated with entering a market. 
 
Barriers to entry are one of the main features in contestable market. The newly identified barriers 
in any industry nowadays are mostly found behind the national frontier. They are not the result of 
measures imposed at the border deliberately to impede imports; instead, they are internal to the domestic 
economy of a trading nation. They include domestic regulatory policies, which often favor established, 
incumbent firms by retarding or preventing the entry of new competitors into regulated markets. Such 
regulations are of concern to any business transaction, in particular of a trade policy, if they impede or 
block market access by foreign firms via either imports or direct investment. Market access barriers can 
also be created by industrial policies that grant subsidies and subsidy-like benefits to favored firms. 
 
In addition to government measures, private business practices can also create market entry 
barriers. These practices include “vertical restraints” such as exclusive dealing relationships between 
firms, thereby forestalling possible sales by other firms. It is difficult for public policy to deal with these 
practices  because  they  might  be  economically  justified  by  the  efficiencies  they  make  possible. 
Nonetheless they may create market access barriers and it is legitimate for policy makers to question 
whether the anti-competitive effects outweigh any resulting efficiencies. 
 
Private and public measures may come in combinations that reinforce their market-restricting 
effects. Although the combinations are not specifically border measures, it may be argued that in some 
cases they have been created with the intent to favor domestically-owned firms over foreign-owned or - 
controlled ones. 
 
Another major barrier to exit is sunk costs. Indeed, it was suggested by Baumol that 
markets would be contestable provided there were no sunk costs.  Sunk costs are costs that have 
been committed by a business that cannot be recovered once a firm has entered the industry. It 
might be  easier to  think of sunk costs  as  costs that are  unavoidable once they have been 
committed at a particular moment in time. Sunk costs will be low where the firm can sell or in 
other ways dispose of its capital equipment without cost. When sunk costs are high, a market is 
more likely to produce a price and output similar to monopoly. 
 
 
 
 
 
1  Barriers to entry, include, special licenses, patents, and copyrights, high fixed costs, marketing barriers (legal and illegal) 
constructed by incumbent firms 
The existence of supernormal profit, no matter how small, would trigger new entry in such a 
market. On the basis of the assumption that existing firms wish to discourage new entry, the logical 
conclusion is that they will set prices at such a level that only normal profits are made. They will also 
produce at lowest possible average cost. If they did not, a new entrant would be able to do so and use the 
cost saving to undercut the existing firm on price and capture some of the market. 
 
The theory of contestable markets suggests that even if there is only one seller, the seller may be 
forced to act as if there were many more. In contrast, there are times when great numbers of sellers are 
able to organize and act as a unified seller. Sellers have the incentive to act in this way because it will 
increase profits. The key to their success is their ability to restrict sales. 
 
Contestable markets are also characterized by 'hit and run' entry. If a firm in a market with no 
entry or exit barriers raises its prices above marginal cost and begins to earn abnormal profit, potential 
rivals will enter the market to take advantage of these profits. In this manner even a single-firm market can 
show highly competitive behavior. 
 
The reality is that no market is perfectly contestable as there are always some “barriers to 
contestability”.  Virtually, every market is contestable to some degree even when it appears that the 
monopoly position of a dominant seller is unquestionable. This can have important implications for the 
competitive behavior (conduct) of existing firms; it also affects the performance of a market from an 
economic  efficiency  stance  such  as  productivity  and  technical  efficiency.  Contestable  markets  are 
different from perfect competitive markets. For example, it is feasible in a contestable market for one firm 
to  dominate  the  industry,  have  price-setting  power  and  also  for  firms  in  a  market  to  produce  a 
differentiated product both of which stick to the assumptions behind the traditional model of perfect 
competition. 
 
Among other things, pricing in a contestable market is competitive; in other words, prices are 
maintained at levels that would prevail if a very large number of sellers participate in the market. If prices 
are held at competitive levels, consumers will receive the benefits of competition even though there may 
be few sellers in the market. Firms in contestable markets for technologically advanced products and 
services must also constantly strive to improve the products or services they offer (and to introduce new 
products at a satisfactory rate) and/or to reduce their operating costs; otherwise, they will be overtaken by 
new rivals in the marketplace. 
 
Consequently, in contestable markets allocative efficiency is high because prices are competitive 
and quantities sold commensurate with demand at these prices. In such circumstances, sufficient resources 
are allocated to produce the relevant goods and services, with the result that there is neither under capacity 
nor overcapacity. As their innovation rates are high, contestable markets tend to be dynamically efficient 
as well. 
 
Contestable markets can affect the performance and conduct of businesses. The actual behavior of 
agents in the market that is more important than a simple picture of market share. Not all markets can, 
however, be fully contestable. A prerequisite for entry into some markets is high fixed costs, allowing 
only one supplier of the good or service concerned to operate efficiently. 
 
In the globalization and technological advancement age, there has been an increase in the number 
of markets and industries that are genuinely contestable. The factors that explain this development include 
competitive advantages, market liberalization, change in competition policy, single market activity and 
technological change. 
In addition, mergers within industries such as banking, telecommunications and airlines have 
created a stir among consumers who claim that economic freedom and efficiency are being sacrificed in 
favor of corporate profits. The theory of contestable markets postulates that firms in imperfectly 
competitive markets may act as though they operate in a purely competitive market when entry and exit 
are perfectly (or nearly) costless. Firms generate a normal profit when faced with the threat of additional 
market  entrants.  As  a  result,  consumers  can  continue  to  enjoy  the  lower  prices  that  accompany 
competition; the merger between firms and subsequent strengthening of business concentration may not 
have detrimental effects on consumers. 
 
The challenge for public policy makers is not to limit competition in the sector but rather to find 
ways of increasing contestability despite the high degree of natural monopoly. These features of 
contestable markets imply that a concentrated banking market can be effectively competitive even if it is 
dominated by a handful of large banks. Therefore, policy makers should be relatively less concerned about 
the market dominance of some types of financial intermediaries in a country’s financial system, if the 
financial markets are contestable. Based on these arguments, deregulation and liberalization will likely 
make the banking industry more contestable or open to competition. 
 
5.0 Market power and structure 
 
Market power can generally be defined as the ability of a particular seller, or group of sellers, to 
influence the prices of a product to their advantage over a sustained period of time. In terms of market 
structure, the contestable theory says that cost of production is minimized in the long-run equilibrium of a 
perfectly contestable market. In a simpler form, market power can be defined as the ability to sell products 
above the marginal cost. In the case of single-product firms with at least two firms in the market the 
theory of contestable markets predicts that production will take place where returns to scale are constant. 
 
An area that link to competition and banking structure is the effect towards economic growth and 
development. When market power is high, firms can increase prices and produce less goods and services, 
provoking inefficient resource allocation as well as reduced capital accumulation and growth. 
 
There are various methods used to measure competition level and market power, in particular, in 
the area of banking industry. Amongst the most popular methods are the Lerner Index, the Herfindahl 
Hirschman Index, the Bresnahan-Lau Model and the Panzar- Rosse of H-Statistic Index. 
 
5.1 Measures of Concentration and Competition 
 
5.1.2 Concentration Measurement 
 
Market concentration is a measure of the number of firms in a given market. The degree to which 
market power can be exercised in a given market is largely a function of market concentration; however, it 
also depends upon the structure of the market, the nature of the particular product being sold in this 
market, the ease of market entry for new firms and the price elasticity of demand for the product. 
 
Based on Cetorelli (1999), the use of concentration ratios to evaluate competitive conditions relies 
on the theoretical predictions of the structure–conduct performance paradigm. According to this paradigm, 
structure affects the conduct of firms, which ultimately determines their performance. Concentration of 
market shares will facilitate the adoption of collusive conduct and, ultimately, the setting of prices 
departing from the perfectly competitive benchmark. In a perfectly competitive market, firms are 
considered too small to have an individual impact on the price of the goods they produce. From the point 
of view of social welfare, perfect competition represents an ideal benchmark, since bank customers pay 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the lowest possible price for the product they demand. Any situation in which firms command some 
degree of market power and are therefore able to set higher than competitive prices implies a social cost in 
terms of welfare loss for consumers. 
 
According to Bikker and Haaf (2002), despite the many different approaches to concentration 
measurement, general agreement prevails that the constituting elements of concentration measures are the 
number of banks (fewness) and the distribution of bank sizes (inequality) in a given market. 
 
Concentration indices exhibit the general form of: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
where is the market share of bank  , is the weight attached to the market share and is the number 
 
 
 
of banks in the market in question. Based on Bikker and Haaf (2002), there are ten concentration ratios 
which are summarized as follows: 
 
The k concentration index is very simple and requires limited data, measured by summing only 
over the market shares of the k largest banks in the market. 
 
The third approach has received widespread acceptance by the academic community. Panzar and 
Rosse (1987) test, or the so called “H-Statistic”, is a popular method used in accessing the competition 
level in the area of banking. This test is based on empirical observation of the impact on firm-level 
revenues of variations in factor input prices. The Rosse-Panzar H-statistic is the sum of the elasticities of a 
firm’s total revenue with respect to its factor input prices. Panzar and Rosse showed that, under certain 
assumptions, the comparative static properties of this type of equations provide a proxy for the overall 
level of competition prevailing in the market. The Panzar-Rosse approach relies on the premise that banks 
will employ different pricing strategies in response to changes in input costs depending on the market 
structure in which they operate. Hence, whether a bank operates in a competitive market or exercises some 
monopoly power can be inferred from an analysis of that bank’s revenue as it responds to changing input 
prices. 
 
In order to measure the competitive structure of the industry, Panzar-Rosse established the ‘‘H- 
statistic’’; this is estimated as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced form revenues with respect to input 
prices. More specifically, the H-statistic measures the percentage change in a bank’s equilibrium revenues 
caused by one percent change in all of the bank’s input prices. 
 
The Panzar-Rosse test has a clear interpretation when applied to the study of markets, given that H 
represents the percentage variation of the equilibrium revenue derived from a unit percent increase in the 
price of all factors used by the firm. For a monopoly, a perfectly colluding oligopoly or a homogeneous 
conjectural variations oligopoly, the value of the H-statistic is less than 0. When the observed firm is in a 
symmetric perfectly competitive market in long-run equilibrium, then H = 1. 
6.0  Literature Review 
 
The Panzar-Rosse method has been employed in numerous studies that have examined the 
competitive structure of the banking industry in various countries. Table 1.2 summarizes the past and 
recent studies conducted applying the Panzar-Rosse test in the area of banking. 
 Table 1: Applications of the Panzar-Rosse Methodology in Banking Studies 
 
 
Authors Period Countries  Results 
DEVELOPED  ECONOMIES 
Shaffer (1982) 
 
1979 
 
New York 
  
1982 -Monopolistic competition 
    1983-84  -  Perfect  competition;  1983–84:  Monopolistic 
Nathan and Neave (1989) 1982–84 Canada  competition 
    Monopoly.: Italy; 
  France,   Germany, Italy,  
Molyneux et al. (1994) 1986–89 Spain, UK  Monopolistic competition: France, Germany, Spain, UK 
Vesala (1995) 1985–92 Finland  Monopolistic competition for all but two years 
Coccorese (1998) 1988–96 Italy  Monopolistic competition 
Coccorese (2004) 1997–99 Italy  Monopolistic competition 
Rime (1999) 1987–94 Switzerland  Monopolistic competition 
Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) 1993–95 Greece  Monopolistic competition 
    Monopolistic competition   (except Belgium and Greece 
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) 1989–96 15 EU countries  with Perfect Competition) 
  Argentina,  Brazil, Chile,  
  Colombia, Costa R ica, El  
Yeyati and Mico (2003) 1993-2002 Salvador,  Monopolistic competition 
 
Mexico and Peru) 
Belaish (2003) 1997-2000 Brazil Oligopoly 
14   Central   and   Eastern 
European Countries Monopolistic  competition (except  2  Macedonia  and 
 Yildrim and Philippatos (2007a)  1993-2000  (CEE)  Slovakia)   
 
Negrin et al. (2006) 2000-2005 Mexico Monopolistic competition 
Matthews et al. (2007) 1980-1984 British Banks Monopolistic competition 
  
Continued  
Authors  Period Countries Results  
 
De Bandt and Davis (2000) 
  
1992–96 
 
France, Germany, Italy 
Monopolistic  competition  :   Large   banks 
countries; small banks in Italy 
in   all 
Bikker and Haaf (2002)  1988–98 23 OECD countries Monopolistic competition  
Hempell (2002)  1993–98 Germany Monopolistic competition  
Central  Eastern  European  and  Former 
Drakos and Konstantinou  1992-2000 Soviet Union Monopolistic competition  
Mamatzakis et al. (2005)  1998-2002 Seven Southern Eastern European Monopolistic competition  
Mkrtchyan (2005)  1998-2002 Armenia Monopolistic competition  
Koutsomanali-Fillapaki  and Staikouras     
 (2005)  1998-2002  EU 10 vs. EU 15  Monopolistic competition   
 
Gutierrez de Rozas (2007) 1985-2005 Spain Monopolistic competition 
Monopolistic competition (oil-producing countries are 
Murjan and Ruza (2002) 1993-1997 Middle East less competitive than non-oil producing countries) 
Staikouras and Kuotsomanoli (2008)           2008                 European Union                                              Monopolistic competition 
Anzoategui et al. (2010)                               1994-2008        Middle East and North Africa                        Monopolistic competition 
Wezel (2010)                                                                          Central America                                              Monopolistic competition 
Castellanos and Garza-García (2013)          2002-2012        Mexico                                                            Monopolistic competition 
 
 
 
 
 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 
 
 
Authors Period Countries Results 
Gelos and Roldos (2002) 8 countries in Latin America &Europe Monopolistic competition 
Monopolistic competition (Competition is more intense 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) 1994-2001 50 countries in countries with low barriers). 
Gunalp and Celik (2006)                              1990-2000        Turkey                                                             Monopolistic competition 
Turk Ariss (2009)                                         1999-2005        Developing Countries                                     Monopolistic competition 
Mensi (2010)                                                1990-2007        Tunisia                                                            Monopolistic competition 
Daley and Matthews (2010)                         1998-2009        Jamaica                                                           Monopolistic competition 
Aktan and Masood (2010)                            1998-2008        Turkey                                                             Monopolistic competition 
Tecles and Tabak ( 2010)                                                       Brazil                                                              Monopolistic competition 
 
Biekpe (2011) 2000-2007 Ghana Monopolistic competition 
Authors Period Countries Results 
Simpasa (2011) 2004-2008 Tanzania Oligopolistic 
Fosu (2013) 2002-3009 African Monopolistic competition 
Gorener and Choi (2013) 1992-2009 Turkey Monopolistic competition 
 
 
OTHER  COUNTRIES 
 
 
Authors Period Countries Results 
1989-1991Q3; 1989-1991:Monopoly; 
 
Niimi (1998) 1994-1996Q3 Japan 1994-1996: Monopolistic competition 
Murjan and Ruza (2002) 1993-1997 Arab Middle East Monopolistic competition 
Perfect competition -Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, UEA 
 
 
 
 
Al-Muharrami et al.(2006) 
 
 
 
1993-2002 
Middle East Countries 
 
(Gulf Cooperation Countries) 
Bahrain, Qatar - Monopolistic competition 
 
Monopoly - Oman 
 
Lee and Lee (2005) 1992-2002 Korea Monopolistic Competition 
   Monopolistic competition – Four largest banks; 
 
Yuan (2006) 
 
1996-2000 
 
China 
 
Perfect competition – Small scale banks 
Prasad and Ghosh (2007) 1996-2004 India Monopolistic competition 
   Monopolistic competition (Pre-crisis period) 
 
Park (2009) 
 
1992-2004 
 
Korea 
 
Perfect competition (Post crisis) 
 
Maghreyeh and Awartani (2014) 
 
2000-2009 
 
CGC 
Perfect  competition  -  market  power  has  a 
influence on bank distress 
positive 
Naceur, BenKhediri and Casu (2009) 2004-2008 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Monopolistic competition  
 
Abdul Majid and Sufian (2007a) 
 
1998-2005 
 
Malaysia 
 
Monopolistic competition 
 
et al. (2007) n Islamic Banks  
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2010)  China Monopolistic competition  
Soedarmono et al.(2012) 2001-2007 12 Asian Countries Monopolistic competition  
Perera,  Skully  and  Wickramanayake 
  (2006)  1995 to 2003  South East Asia  Monopolistic competition   
 
Ou and Tan (2011)  1993-2007 
Qiang and Qiao (2011)  2000-2007 
Chen and Yang (2012)  1998-2008 
Source :Author's  compilation. 
Chinese Banking Industry 
China 
China 
Monopolistic  competition 
Monopolistic  competition 
Monopolistic  competition 
 Using Panzar-Rosse  method, Aktan and Masood (2010) examined the competitive structures 
of the Turkish banking industry from 1998 to 2008 and investigated the factors that explain variances 
in the degree of competitiveness.  The results indicated that the banking industry in Turkey was in a 
long run equilibrium state. They also found that the banks in Turkey were operating as a whole under 
conditions  of monopolistic  competition.  The Turkish banks were found  to be able to achieve  high 
records of profitability in monopolistically competitive markets. 
 
Daley and Matthews (2010) conducted an empirical assessment of the degree of competition 
within the Jamaican  banking  sector during the period of 1998 to 2009. They employed  a dynamic 
version  of  the  Panzar  - Rosse  Model  to estimate  market  power  among  the  sample  of banks  that 
constituted over 90 percent of the banking market. Using the conventional  statistical tests, the Daley 
and Matthews (2010) was unable to reject monopoly/perfect collusion for the merchant banking sector 
in Jamaica but found competitive conditions in the commercial banking sector. Their result contrasted 
with  earlier  findings  done  on  Jamaican  banking  sector  using  alternative  estimators  that  found 
monopolistic competition in the market as a whole. 
 
Anzoategui  et  al.’s  (2010)  studied  on Russian  banks  found  that  government-owned  banks 
appeared to be less competitive than privately-owned banks, and that banks which focused on lending 
to individuals were less competitive than those that concentrated on financing. The study also found 
that the top 20 banks appeared to exert more market power relative to smaller banks. On the other 
hand, there were no significant differences in the competitive behavior of foreign and domestic banks. 
 
Biekpe  (2011)  empirically  examined  the  degree  of  bank  competition  and  intermediation 
efficiency in Ghana. The result obtained suggested a non-competitive market structure in the Ghanaian 
banking  system,  which  hampers  financial  intermediation.  Biekpe  (2011)  also  found  that  Ghanaian 
banks were monopolistically competitive. It was argued that the structure, as well as the other markets 
characteristics,  constituted  an  indirect  barrier  to  entry  thereby  shielding  the  large  profits  in  the 
Ghanaian banking system. Further, it was argued that policies that encourage and stimulate greater 
consolidation  in the financial sector would go a long way to enhance competition  among banks and 
improve efficiency and profitability. 
 
Simpasa (2011) analysed the competition  condition of the Tanzanian  banking industry from 
2004 to 2008, also by employing the Panzar–Rosse  methodology  to compute the competitive index. 
Taking into account risk, efficiency,  regulatory  and macroeconomic  factors, the results showed that 
banks in Tanzania earned their income under conditions of oligopolistic conduct. Moreover, the 
competitive index derived from an interest revenue equation was not significantly different from that 
obtained using an aggregate revenue measure. The result suggested that the degree of contestability 
from  traditional   intermediation   activities   approximates   overall  bank  behaviour.   The  Tanzanian 
banking  industry  greater  market  contestability  can  be  achieved  by  adopting  measures  aimed  at 
stimulating  competitiveness  in  the  banking  sector,  including  consolidating  gains  on  the 
macroeconomic front and allowing more foreign bank entry. 
 
Qiang and Qiao (2011) studied the banking market structure and competition status in China's 
financial  industry  based  on  Panzar-Rosse   model  from  2000  to  2007  by  using  the  H  statistics 
method.The result showed that China's banking sector is still in monopolistic competition state and the 
transition from monopoly to moderate competition, and the banking industry needs more competition 
policy in order to ensure proper competition in China's financial market and promote its development. 
 
Meanwhile, Ou and Tan (2011) examined the competition degree of Chinese Banking Industry 
from  1993  to 2007  is studied  from  multi-perspectives  based  on the  basic  model  of Panzar-Rosse 
method. They concluded that competition degree of Chinese banking industry fluctuates periodically 
and deposit  prices are the most influencing  inputted-factor  prices for return  on assets.  Contrary  to 
common views, the competition between Joint-stock Commercial Banks was less fierce than the 
competition of the whole banking industry. 
 Chen  and  Yang  (2012)  applied  Panzar-Rosse  model  to  assess  the  competition  degree  in  China's 
banking industry from 1998 to 2008 on the relationship  between financial market development  and 
China's banking competition. The results showed that banks in China were operating basically under 
monopolistic   competition,   the  competition   effect  of  financial  market  development   has  a  more 
significant  influence  on China's banking  competition  at the present  stage, and both asset scale and 
liquidity of stock market played a significant role in promoting China's banking industry. 
 
Bikker et al. (2012) summarized empirical analysis of competition in banking, using a sample 
containing  more  than 100,000  bank-year  observations  on more  than 17,000  banks  in 63 countries 
during the years 1994 to 2004. 
 
Chiang (2012) measured the competitive landscape of the banking industry in four regions of 
Europe and four single country’s banking sector during the period of 2005-2009 with the focus on the 
impact of the financial crisis on the market structures; the sample period wass during 2005-2007 and 
2008-2009,   by  the   financial   crisis   cut-off   point   in  2008. The   empirical   results   revealed   the 
monopolistic competition of the banking industry of four European regions countries before and after 
the financial crisis, but the degree of competition in the operation of the European Union has changed 
little;  on  the  other  hands,  the  competitiveness  of  the  four  European  countries  was  monopolistic 
competition before the financial crisis and the country’s industrial structure has significant differences 
after the crisis. It wass also noted that the effects of the financial crisis have seriously affected the 
structure of banking and banking revenue by macro-economic situation. 
 
Fosu (2013) investigated banking competition across subregional banking markets in Africa. 
Panzar–Rosse model was adopted beside the static model to assess the overall extent of banking 
competition in each subregional banking market oin Africa from 2002 to 2009. Consistent with other 
emerging economies, the results suggested that African banks generally demonstrate monopolistic 
competitive behaviour. The result suggested that recent structural reforms within Africa may have had 
significant effects as far as banking sector competition  is concerned. African banks exhibited higher 
competition at interest-generating activities compared to total banking activities. 
 
Castellanosa  and    Garza-García  (2013)  examines  the  evolution  of  the  efficiency  of  the 
Mexican banking sector from 2002 to 2012 and analyses its relationship  with the degree of banking 
competition. Efficiency tests were estimated by applying the non-parametric methodology, the Data 
Envelopment Analysis. Meanwhile, the Boone Indicator was used to assess the degree of competition 
and  included  among  other  possible  determinants  of  bank  efficiency.  The  main  results  indicated 
increasing trends of efficiency in the banking sector during the period of study. A direct relationship 
between banking competition and efficiency was observed. Castellanosa and Garza-García also found 
that the Mexican banking system’s average efficiency trend is observed among both local and foreign 
banks, however, the local banks are somewhat more efficient. 
 
By employing the Panzar-Rosse (P-R) H-statistic method, Sufian   and Habibullah (2013) 
examined  the  impact  of  consolidation  on  the  Malaysian  banking  sector’s  market  structure  and 
competition from 1996-2008. The results indicated that Malaysian banks operate under monopolistic 
competition.  This empirical findings indicated that competitive behaviour of banks may be explained 
by  factors  other  than  the  number  of  banks  operating  in  the  banking  sector  and  their  level  of 
concentration.  However,  Sufian  and  Habibullah  (2013)  highlighted  the  need  to stress  out that  the 
results  need to be interpreted  with caution since the liberalization  of the Malaysian  banking  sector 
remains an ongoing process. The empirical findings seem to suggest that Malaysian banks have been 
earning their revenues in a monopolistic  competition market condition. Therefore, during the period 
under study any form of conjectural  variation,  oligopoly,  and/or  monopoly  is rejected.  It was also 
worth noting that the degree of competition in the Malaysian banking sector has been higher during 
the pre-merger (1996-2000) period compared to the post-merger period (2001-20080. The empirical 
findings from their study differed from Majid and Sufian (2006) which suggested that the level of 
competition  was higher  during  the post-merger  compared  to the pre-merger  period  under  the total 
revenue estimation. 
 Andrade (2013) assessed the degree of competition within the enlarged European Union (EU) 
commercial banking system during the period ranging from 2004 to 2011 using the non-structural test 
developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). The study concluded that banking industry in the region does 
not seem to have operated either under perfect competition or under perfect monopoly, but rather 
consistently with long-run monopolistic competition. They also found empirical evidence of efficiency 
hypothesis posted by Demestz (1973) and Peltzman (1977), as opposed to conventional view that 
concentration  impaired  price  competitiveness.  They  concluded  with  underlining  the  importance  of 
tradeoff between the costs and benefits of competition to support financial stability objectives. 
 
Fosu (2013) examined the extent of banking competition  in African sub-regional markets. A 
dynamic version of the Panzar-Rosse model was adopted beside the static model to assess the overall 
extent of banking competition in each sub-regional banking market over the period 2002 to 2009. 
Consistent  with  other  emerging  economies,  the  results  suggested  that  African  banks  generally 
demonstrate  monopolistic  competitive  behaviour.  Although  the  evidence  suggested  that  the  static 
Panzar-Rosse  H-statistic  was downward  biased  compared  to the dynamic  version,  the competitive 
nature identified remains robust to alternative estimators. 
 
Gorener  and  Choi  (2013)  investigated  the  competitive  conditions  in  the  Turkish  banking 
system over the period of 1992–2009  using Panzar-Rosse  Model. The empirical  findings suggested 
that the Turkish banking market was monopolistically competitive during the pre-crisis period and the 
post-crisis period, (1992–1998) and (2004–2009), respectively; but the level of competition increased 
to perfect competition for the period of 1999–2003, the crisis period. The findings also indicated that 
the   Turkish   banking   market   was   in   long-run   equilibrium   before   1998,   the   crisis,   fell   into 
disequilibrium  during the crisis period, but made adjustments  to the new equilibrium.  Although  the 
Turkish banking system has become more concentrated  due to the restructuring  since the crisis, the 
study shows that the bank competition has not been affected negatively by the bank consolidation. The 
Turkish banking system may have remained competitive despite its consolidation  due to the entry of 
foreign banks and increased foreign ownership of domestic banks. 
 
Cubillas and Suarez (2013) analyzed how a banking crisis affects bank market power in an 
international  sample of 64 countries over the period before the current global financial crisis (1989– 
2007). They also studied whether and how this effect varies depending on the degree of severity of the 
crisis and across countries depending on their bank regulation and institutional quality. From country- 
and bank-level data, they provided the empirical evidence on the increased in bank market power in 
the years after banking  crisis that is consistent  with the processes  of restructuring  that often occur 
during  episodes  of financial  distress.  The disappearance  of failed  banks,  mergers  or absorption  of 
banks  with  insolvency   problems   by  others  implied   an  increase  in  the  level  of  bank  market 
concentration  that seems to increase the market power of surviving banks. Moreover, the greater the 
severity of the crisis, the higher the increased experienced by banks in terms of market power in the 
following  years.  The  results  also  indicated  that  the  effect  is  stronger  in  countries  with  more 
competitive  banking systems  before the crisis. Bank competition  was greater in countries  with less 
strict restrictions on non-traditional bank activities and fewer barriers to bank entry so banks operating 
in the sector will probably enjoy a greater market power. Likewise, in countries with well-developed 
institutions promoting bank competition, the increase in market power after the crisis will be more 
pronounced. 
 
Maghreyeh  and Awartani (2014) studied 70 banks over the period 2000–2009  in the in the 
Gulf Cooperation  Council countries  (GCC) and found that banks that small, less capitalized,  banks 
with low profitability, low liquidity, or risky asset portfolios banks were more susceptible to distress 
than  other  banks.  Similarly,  the  influence  of efficiency  on  the  chance  of  distress  is negative  and 
significant  and thus,  banks  were  more  likely  to face  troubles  in the  future  when  they  are  poorly 
managed.  The  evidence  from  their  study  also  indicated  that  banks  operating  in  a  competitive 
environment are more fragile. Their finding followed the competition-fragility hypothesis of Hellmann 
et al. (2000) and it also consistent with the results of Matutes and Vives (1996), Matutes and Vives 
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th 
(2000)  and  Repullo  (2004).  However,  it  was  contrasted  to  Boyd  et  al.  (2007),  De  Nicoló  and 
Loukoianova  (2007),  Schaeck  et al. (2009),  Uhde and Heimeshoff  (2009),  Cipollini  and Fiordelisi 
(2009), and Poghosyan  andˇCihák (2011); who found that market power has a positive influence on 
bank distress. 
 
Abdelkader   and  Mansouri   (2014)  employed   the  Panzar–Rosse H-statistic   to  assess  the 
competitive  conditions  of the Tunisian  banking industry over the period 1999 to 2003. The results 
showed that the banking market is in long-run equilibrium and the Panzar–Rosse H-statistic indicated 
that  the  Tunisian  banking  market  is  operating  under  conditions  of  monopoly.  It  seems  that  the 
liberalization process and the reforms implemented since 1987 to the banking sector in Tunisia could 
not compensate the existence of market power in the banking sector from 1999 to 2003. 
 
7.0        K- Concentration ratio 
 
CRk  is computed as the sum of top k
th
-tier firms' market shares and summing only the market 
shares of the k largest banks in the market, it takes the form: 
 
k 
CR
k  
  S i 
i 1 
 
(1.1) 
 
CRk  highlights  the market structure through market shares of a few dominating  firms. This 
index is based on the idea that the behavior  of a market is dominated  by a small number  of large 
banks. The CRk  index is very useful to examine the market influence of a few dominating firms in the 
market. However, it is not so useful in grasping the general features of market structure. 
 
In this study, the bank concentration  index of the highest  two (CR2), three (CR3) and five 
(CR5) bank total assets, total deposits and total loans will be measured. 
 
8.0 Herfindahl Hirschman Index 
 
 
The Herfindahl – Hirschman Index is a simple but useful tool for the measurement of 
concentration within an industry. It is calculated as the sum of the squared deposit market shares of all 
the banks in the market, where market share may be based on either deposits or assets. Market shares 
are typically  derived  from deposits,  because  it is assumed  that the level  of a bank's  deposits  in a 
market is an indication of the level of its other banking services in that same market. The HHI can be 
computed as follows: 
K 
HHI   MS i 
 
(1.2) 
i 1 
where  MS i is the bank’s market share of the i 
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firm and n represents the number of banks in the sector. 
The sum of market share is 100% (  MS i  100% ). 
 
By construction, the HH index has an upper value of 10,000 in the case of a monopolist firm 
with a 100% share of the market -- the index tends to zero in the case of a large number of firms with 
very  small  market  shares.  The  lower  bound  of  zero  is  attained  when  the  market  is  perfectly 
competitive. Therefore, the larger the HHI, the more concentrated the market becomes. 
 
In other definition, a market is “unconcentrated” if its HHI is less than 1,000, “moderately 
concentrated” if its HHI lies between 1,000 and 1,800; and “highly concentrated” if its HHI is greater 
than 1,800 (Rudkevich et al., 1998). A market with 10 firms with equal shares would have an HH 
index of 1000 but an uneven distribution of market shares may affect the index substantially. 
 9.0 Panzar Rosse Model 
 
The Panzar-Rosse static analysis requires the estimation of a reduced form revenue equation, 
when considering  that the total revenue  (unlike  the price and quantity)  is easily observable.  For a 
single firm, the equilibrium total revenue is given by the equilibrium quantity times the equilibrium 
price. Both depend on costs, demand, and conduct: therefore in the revenue function for all the shifters 
of cost and demand must be included, with particular attention given to factor prices. For the i th firm, 
the reduced form revenue equation is the following: 
R it     f (W it , Z it , Y it ,  t  ) (1.3) 
 
where Wit , is the vector of factor prices, Zit the variables that shift the cost function, Yt  the variables 
shifting the demand  function  and   
t 
is the error term. If R
it  
/ W
itk 
is the derivative  of the total 
revenue with respect to the price of the k th input, the Rosse and Panzar H-test can be written as 
 R W  
H  
  it  itk 

 (1.4) 
k  Witk Rit  

That is, it is the sum of the elasticities  of the reduced form revenue with respect to all the 
factor  prices.  Hence,  the calculation  of the H-statistic  requires  firm-specific  data on revenues  and 
factor prices only. Further information on costs is not required, although the insertion of every variable 
shifting demand or cost is needed. 
 
Based on the results of concentration conditions as depicted by HHI and CRk results as shown 
earlier, it is hypothesized that the banks in the five Asian banking sectors operate under conditions of 
monopolistic  competition.  Therefore, the H-statistic  values are expected to be greater than zero and 
less than one. For the long run equilibrium level, similar result is also expected; the E-statistics values 
are expected to range between zeros to one. 
 
Shaffer (1982) showed that the H-statistic is also unity for a natural monopoly operating in a 
perfectly  contestable  market  and  also  for  a  sales-maximizing   firm  that  is  subject  to  breakeven 
constraints.  Panzar-Rosse  differentiate  the situation of monopolistic  competition,  in which, although 
banks behave like monopolists, the market entry or exit of other banks with imperfect rival products 
makes them always generating precisely zero profits. In this case, the H-statistic will lie between zero 
and unity, as revenues will increase less than proportionally to changes in input prices. Table 1.3 
summarizes the interpretation of the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics result. 
 
Table  3: Interpretation of the Panzar-Rosse H Statistic 
 
H-value  Interpretation 
 
 
H<0 Monopoly or perfectly collusive oligopoly 
H<0<1  Monopolistic competition 
H=1 Perfect competition, natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable market, 
 
  or sales-maximizing firm subject to a break-even constraint   
 
According to Shafer (1982, 1985), Nathan and Neave (1989), Molyneux et al. (1994) and 
Hondroyiannis at al. (1999), the following bank revenue equation is estimated in which revenue is 
explained  by factor  prices  and other  bank-specific  variables  that  affect  long-run  equilibrium  bank 
revenues: 
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(1.5) 
 
(1.6) 
For t  1,..., T , where T is the number of periods observed and i  1,..., I where  I is the total number 
of banks and in is the natural logarithm. Meanwhile,  is an overall constant and  it represents the 
 
 
stochastic error term. 
 
The first dependent variable is lnTINT, the ratio of total interest income to the total asset, as in 
Molyneuxet al. (1994). Traditional approaches in the literature have used either gross interest or total 
income as dependent variable. The decision to consider only the interest part of the total revenue of 
banks is consistent with the underlying notion inherent in the Panzar Rosse model, that financial 
intermediation  is the core business of most banks. However,  Shaffer (1982) and Nathan and Neave 
(1989) took lnTREV, total revenue, as their dependent variable. lnTREV is the ratio of total revenue to 
total assets (where total revenue is calculated as gross interest revenue plus other operating revenues, 
such as fee income, commission income and bank charges). 
 
In this study, panel data for commercial  banks in Malaysia from 1996 to 2009 are used and 
were extracted from a series of banks Annual Reports taken from BankScope Fitch-International Bank 
Credit Analysis Limited (IBCA) database. Meanwhile, for country-specific data, datasets from 
International Financial Statistics from the International Monetary Fund and Thomson DataStream are 
used. The dataset has also taken into account mergers and acquisitions. When there is a merger, the 
database also provides information for the largest bank of the merged group while exiting banks are 
deleted fully from the database. In the case of Asian banking industry where there were a number of 
merger and acquisition or banks were required to close down following the Asian financial crisis back 
in 1997, a number of data was not available. In this respect, only prominent banks are covered in the 
database with smaller ones accorded less attention. The data is different from the other paper as it 
encompassed both domestic and foreign owned commercial banks. 
 
10.       Results 
 
For Malaysia, the concentration  conditions increased when the variables for top 2, top 3 and 
top 5 largest banks were computed. Starting with 0.32 in CR2, it increased to 0.52 and 0.67 for CR3 
and CR5, respectively.  Thailand’s  concentration  condition  ranged from 0.34 to 0.69, an increase of 
41%  and 44%  when  CR3  and CR5   were used, respectively.  Concentration  conditions  in Indonesia 
showed  a  slight  growth  of  concentration  from  0.33  to  0.46  to  0.61  under  CR1,  CR3   and  CR5, 
respectively.  Having  a total of 121 banks,  the increment  showed  that banks  in Indonesia  had low 
concentration in competition. To some extent, the indices reflected the higher concentration in the 
Philippines and Singapore. Due to data availability, only small numbers of banks were included in the 
sample data. 
 
The market concentration  ratio in Malaysian banking industry showed an increasing trend in 
between 1996-2000,  after the financial crisis followed  by the first phase of financial  consolidation. 
The following changes can be seen from Malaysia banking industry results. 
 
i. The HHI estimate based on total deposit increased to 1,104.53 (1,006.09 in 1996), 
ii.  The CR2 estimate decreased just by 0.01 (0.38 in 1996), 
 iii. CR3 estimate remained the same at 0.47 and 
iv. CR5 estimate increased by 0.04 point (0.58 in 1996). Meanwhile, 
v. the HHI estimate based on total loan increased from 957.61 in 1996 to 1,124.79 in 2009, 
vi. CR2 estimate increased by 0.01 (0.36 in 1996), 
vii. CR3 estimate improved to 0.47 from earlier 0.43 and 
viii. CR5 estimate increased by 0.07 point (0.55 in 1996). 
 
This increasing trend was due to the Central Bank monetary activity to restructure the banking 
system  after the Asian  financial  crisis  in 1997.  All domestic  banking  institutions  were  advised  to 
merge so that six banking groups could be formed (initially ten banking groups). Even though the first 
phase of consolidation  had led to increase in concentration  ratios, it was not sufficient  to make the 
banking system to become anti-competitive.  The restructuring  of the banking system was mainly to 
remove the unhealthy financial institutions and to retain sound financial institutions in the system. The 
increased number of other financial institutions could create further stiff competition among the banks 
(BNM, 1999). 
  
 
 
 
   Table 4: Results of Bank Concentration Ratio for Malaysian Banking Industry    
Total Assets  Total Deposits  Total Loans 
  CR2  CR3  CR5  HHI  CR2  CR3  CR5  HHI  CR2  CR3  CR5  HHI   
1995 0.38 0.48 0.58 1035.92 0.39 0.49 0.59 1065.21 0.37 0.44 0.56 1000.61 
1996 0.38 0.47 0.58 1006.09 0.39 0.48 0.58 1022.20 0.36 0.43 0.55 957.61 
1997 0.38 0.45 0.58 1148.26 0.39 0.46 0.59 1108.34 0.37 0.44 0.56 1103.57 
1998 0.35 0.44 0.55 1003.72 0.36 0.44 0.55 1001.27 0.36 0.43 0.54 1044.88 
1999 0.36 0.46 0.60 1020.97 0.36 0.46 0.60 1016.73 0.36 0.47 0.59 1052.85 
2000 0.37 0.47 0.62 1104.53 0.37 0.46 0.62 1105.48 0.37 0.47 0.62 1124.79 
2001 0.37 0.46 0.63 1127.56 0.37 0.47 0.63 1158.88 0.37 0.48 0.63 1166.75 
2002 0.34 0.44 0.59 1034.72 0.34 0.44 0.59 1029.82 0.34 0.43 0.58 1018.18 
2003 0.34 0.43 0.59 1022.05 0.33 0.42 0.58 1007.38 0.34 0.45 0.60 1058.00 
2004 0.34 0.44 0.60 1016.43 0.34 0.44 0.60 1009.46 0.34 0.45 0.61 1043.16 
2005 0.34 0.44 0.60 995.21 0.33 0.44 0.60 987.53 0.35 0.45 0.62 1039.92 
2006 0.36 0.49 0.64 1083.63 0.35 0.48 0.64 1065.62 0.36 0.49 0.66 1122.25 
2007 0.36 0.49 0.64 1095.20 0.36 0.49 0.64 1079.21 0.37 0.50 0.67 1135.68 
2008 0.38 0.51 0.65 1135.00 0.37 0.50 0.65 1119.14 0.40 0.52 0.68 1212.28 
2009 0.38 0.52 0.67 1161.83 0.37 0.52 0.66 1135.68 0.39 0.53 0.70 1215.55 
Note: (CRk) for k = 2, 3 and 5 bank. It means the bank concentration  index of the largest two (CR2), three (CR3) and five (CR5) banks. Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI) of 
bank concentration is defined as the sum of squared market shares of respective variables. 
  
The second phase of consolidation  was between 2001-2004,  where the market concentration 
ratios for CR2, CR3, CR5 and HHI, based on total loans show a decreasing trend of 0.34 (0.37 in 2001), 
0.0.45 (0.48 in 2001) , 0.61 (0.63 in 2001) and 1,043.16 (1,166.75 in 2001), respectively.  The HHI, 
CR2, CR3, and CR5  based on total deposit  revealed  a similar trend to that of market  concentration 
based on total loans. These trends indicated that the first plan of consolidation to merge the domestic 
commercial banks into six anchor banks was a failure. 
 
In 2005,  the HHI results  based  on total  assets,  total loans  and total deposits  were at their 
lowest point, while result for the concentration ratios, CR2, CR3, and CR5 remained relatively the same 
as  previous  year  2004.  The  sharp  increase  seen  in  year  2006  in  the  market  concentration  ratios 
reflected the changes in the market structure and the distribution of market shares derived from the 
completion of all merger and acquisition exercise during the second phase of consolidation.  In these 
periods, the completion of merger and acquisition had contributed to the expansion of market share of 
the remaining existing financial institutions. Hence, the plan to initiate further merger and acquisition 
without opening the market to further competition would increase the market concentration and may 
lead to anti-competitive actions by financial institutions. 
 
Malaysia’s concentration condition based on the Herfindahl Hirschman Index seemed to tally 
with  the  economic  and  the  current  year  financial  growth.  For  instance,  concentration  conditions 
dropped after the financial crisis strike which meant the banks were still unstable and were making 
their own recovery following the financial turbulence. The episode of mega mergers had caused 
concentration condition to decrease as the banks and their merger partners adjusted to the new 
management. Concentration conditions seemed to improve after the process. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Result of the Herfindahl Hirschman Index for Malaysia 
 10.1     Results of Panzar- Rosse Test 
 
The empirical results for the competitive position for Malaysia using three different dependent 
variables, namely the total interest revenue (lnTREV),  total interest income (lnTINT) and return on 
equity (ln1+ROA) are reported in Table 5.18. All tests confirmed the good fit of the models. 
 
In the Panzar-Rosse test, the estimated regression equations for fixed effect model differ in the 
range of 52.59 to 55% based on the three equations. Two of the variables of banking cost, price of 
labor (lnPL) and price of capital (lnPK) were statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level for total 
interest  income  and  total  revenue,  respectively,   with  price  of  labor  showing  higher  elasticity. 
Specifically, looking at each input level, the coefficients on the bank specific factors were positive for 
price of labor (lnPL) in all three dependent variables with the elasticity of 0.2512, 0.2484 and 0.0036. 
25% of the total interest income was due to positive effect from the price of labor. The same positive 
sign was found for the unit price of capital (lnPK) with a lower elasticity and  0.0608 and 0.0603 for 
the short run estimation  model. Yet, a negative sign is found for long run equilibrium  test with the 
return on assets as the dependent  variable.  The effect of the price of fund (lnPF) was found to be 
negatively  correlated  in all the three  dependent  variables  and the overall  elasticity  appeared  to be 
minimal (and statistically insignificant) compared to other two input prices. 
 
The results implied that the increase in labor and capital acquisition  costs had led to higher 
interest income, higher revenue and higher return on asset, respectively, for the Malaysian commercial 
banks. This may suggests that the growing interest by bank in the fee and commission-based  product 
market segment and large investment in capital including technology and new products development 
have improved their financial performance. 
 
The results for the Malaysian commercial banks signaled that labor and capital cost were 
significant in determining the income earned by the banks. Meanwhile, the higher the price of fund, 
the lower would be the total interest, revenue and return on asset earned. This result indicated that 
banks in Malaysia were competing competitively. Those banks which offered reasonable lending rate 
would be able to generate more income. 
 
The H-statistics, an indicator for the degree of competition were positive between the range of 
0.0021  to  0.3239  in  both  pooled  and  fixed  effect  equations.  The  H-statistics  for  lnTINT  as  the 
dependent  variable produced  similar estimate  with lnTREV  for both pooled and fixed effect model 
0.2288.   This   rejects   the   monopoly   hypothesis,   the   conjectural   variations   short-run   oligopoly 
hypothesis, and the hypothesis of perfect competition. Our findings indicated that banks in Malaysia 
operated under monopolistic  competition  between 1996 and 2009.   The result is consistent with the 
study by Claessens and Leaven (2004) on Malaysia and studies on other developing countries (Al- 
Muharrami  et  al.,  2006;  Perera  et  al.,  2006;  Abdul  Majid  et al.,  2007)  that  found  H-statistics  of 
between zero and one (i.e. monopolistic competition). Therefore, the H-statistic results suggested that 
the Malaysian banking sector earned their revenue in market condition of monopolistic  competition 
and  any form  of conjectural  variation  oligopoly  and monopoly  can  be clearly  rejected  during  the 
sample periods. On the other hand, competitive conditions still under the monopolistic competition but 
with  lessen  value,  in  a  long  term  period.  The  E-Statistics  found  for  long  run  equilibrium  test 
(ln1+ROA) showed that the figure reduced to 0.0021, very much lower than those found in the other 
two tests. 
 
The major  contribution  to the H-statistic  mainly came from unit price  of labor (lnPL) and 
followed by unit price of capital (lnPL). This highlights that asset and labor cost are the main factors 
in the production  function of interest  income and total revenue  for Malaysian  banks. This result is 
similar to those of Abdul Majid et al. (2007), probably due the effect of the increased usage of online 
banking and phone banking in the recent years in Malaysia. The positive sign of unit price of labor 
(lnPL) suggested that personnel costs are as important as overhead costs which are relatively high in 
the banking industry.   Meanwhile, the positive sign of unit price of capital (lnPK) may indicate that 
preferences of bank customer to deal with banks offering the lowest cost of fund. Nevertheless, in both 
 specifications,  the effect of the price of fund on the overall  elasticity  appeared  to be negative  and 
minimal  compared  to other  input  prices.  This  implies  that  the  change  of  interest  rate  offered  by 
Malaysian financial institutions adversely affect their income and revenue. The results are consistent 
with other studies that its impact is negligible on the factor price elasticity (Al-Muharrami et al., 2006; 
Perera et al., 2006; Abdul Majid et al., 2007). 
 
Moving on to the bank specific variables, the result based on the size of banks as indicated by 
the  ratio  of  loan  to  total  asset  (lnLOANTA),  shows  loan  size  is  positively  related  and  highly 
significance to the total interest income earned and total revenue recorded. Based on the result for 
ln(1+ROA), 27% of the loan to total asset increased for a 1% increase in total interest income and total 
revenue, but in the long run, only 0.9% increment was found. 
 
The coefficient of the total asset variable is positive and statistically significant in the ordinary 
least square (OLS) model for all three different types of independent variables, whereas for the fixed 
effect model, it has a negative coefficient. The coefficient of the total asset variable is negative and 
statistically  significant  in fixed  effect  model  which  suggested  that  size  is not  a major  factor  that 
contributes to the different income and revenue earned for Malaysian banks. Different sizes between 
banks may lead to lower total revenue per unit of assets and that larger banks seem to be less efficient 
compared  to  smaller  banks.  Ten  anchor  banks  are  now  (2013)  operating  in  Malaysia  in,  which 
comprised  of the local commercial  banks. These banks are similar in term of sizes after the merger 
move  (BNM,  2009).  This  also  suggests  that  as  a  whole  the  banking  market  in  Malaysia  faces 
diseconomies  of  scale  with  respect  to  producing  interest-based  revenue  despite  the  mergers  and 
acquisitions that had taken place. 
 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of the variable depicting risk propensity (lnLOANLOSSTA)  were 
both positive for total interest income and total revenue, suggesting that banks with a higher level of 
loan  loss  provisions  indicated  a  more  risky  loan  portfolio  and  consequently  a  higher  level  of 
compensating   return.  This  therefore   had  a  positive  effect  on  interest   income  but  statistically 
insignificant. The elasticity were 0.3245, 0.3436 and -0.5891 which were all insignificant.   A positive 
lnLOANLOSSTA  indicates that bank operating with higher provisions to assets in their balance sheet 
generate  higher  revenue  per  unit  of  assets.  In  the  long  run,  this  variable  shows  a  negative  and 
significant value as depicted by the return to asset result. 
 
The coefficient of equity to total asset (lnEQUITYTA) in the OLS model was positive and 
statistically significant at 1% level for the period 1996-2009 for all the three specification models. The 
fixed effect model result showed a positive result but with an insignificant value. The coefficient for 
this is the highest among the banks’ specific  variable  used.   The result is consistent  to Berger and 
Mester (1997) and Isik and Hassan (2003). This means that Malaysian banks are well capitalized bank 
and efficient in generating their revenue. 
 Table 4: Summary Results of Panzar-Rosse Test for Malaysia 
 
Dependent / 
Independent 
lnTINT 
POOLED 
 
FIXED 
lnTREV 
POOLED 
 
FIXED 
ln(1+ROA) 
POOLED 
 
FIXED 
 Variables   
 
lnPL 
OLS   
 
0.3166 
EFFECT   
 
0.2512 
OLS   
 
0.3156 
EFFECT   
 
0.2484 
OLS   
 
0.0020 
EFFECT   
 
0.0036 
 (7.26***) (2.77***) (7.26***) (2.74**) (2.19**) (1.41) 
lnPK 0.0727 0.0608 0.0722 0.0603 0.0006 -0.0005 
 (3.07***) (2.22**) (3.06***) (2.2**) (1.52) (-0.84) 
lnPF -0.0664 -0.0832 -0.0639 -0.0800 -0.0004 -0.0010 
 (-1.12) (-1.13) (-1.08) (-1.09) (-0.3) (-0.62) 
lnTA 0.0809 -0.0130 0.0806 -0.0129 0.0012 0.0008 
 (6.48***) (-0.19) (6.46***) (-0.19) (4.22***) (0.65) 
lnEQUITYTA 3.0117 1.8798 3.0019 1.8819 0.0520 0.0198 
 (5.85***) (1.63) (5.84***) (1.63) (5.19***) (0.82) 
lnLOANLOSSTA 0.6210 0.3245 0.6389 0.3436 -0.5927 -0.5891 
 (0.27) (0.14) (0.28) (0.15) (-10.59***) (-10.68***) 
lnLOANTA 0.2519 0.2679 0.2514 0.2682 0.0008 0.0009 
 (6.6***) (6.94***) (6.6***) (7***) (1.18) (0.81) 
 
yr1 
 
-0.1759 
 
-0.1798 
 
-0.1751 
 
-0.1787 
 
-0.0045 
 
-0.0048 
 (-2.51**) (-2.3**) (-2.51**) (-2.28**) (-2.47**) (-2.47**) 
yr2 -0.1534 -0.1568 -0.1530 -0.1563 -0.0028 -0.0028 
 (-2.55**) (-2.73**) (-2.55**) (-2.72**) (-1.61) (-1.73**) 
yr3 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) (omitted) 
yr4 -0.3158 -0.3237 -0.3140 -0.3216 -0.0016 -0.0020 
 (-3.13***) (-3.39***) (-3.13***) (-3.38***) (-0.75) (-1.21) 
yr5 -0.2560 -0.2553 -0.2519 -0.2505 -0.0032 -0.0040 
 (-3.38***) (-2.83***) (-3.3***) (-2.76***) (-1.53) (-1.67) 
yr6 -0.3740 -0.3793 -0.3722 -0.3769 -0.0054 -0.0063 
 (-4.92***) (-3.95***) (-4.91***) (-3.92***) (-2.64***) (-2.63**) 
yr7 -0.4688 -0.4611 -0.4663 -0.4580 -0.0065 -0.0071 
 (-5.23***) (-3.99***) (-5.22***) (-3.96***) (-2.99***) (-2.44**) 
yr8 -0.4516 -0.4677 -0.4491 -0.4644 -0.0076 -0.0084 
 (-4.71***) (-3.86***) (-4.69***) (-3.83***) (-3.03***) (-2.46**) 
yr9 -0.5251 -0.5364 -0.5224 -0.5329 -0.0074 -0.0081 
 (-5.13***) (-3.77***) (-5.11***) (-3.75***) (-3.02***) (-2.34**) 
yr10 -0.5167 -0.5222 -0.5143 -0.5191 -0.0070 -0.0077 
 (-5.48***) (-4.03***) (-5.46***) (-4***) (-3.13***) (-2.42**) 
  
Continued - Summary Result of Panzar-Rosse Model for Malaysia 
 
Dependent / lnTINT  lnTREV  ln(1+ROA)  
Independent POOLED FIXED POOLED FIXED POOLED FIXED 
 
 Variables  OLS  EFFECT  OLS  EFFECT  OLS  EFFECT   
 
 
yr11 -0.4811 -0.4554 -0.4788 -0.4524 -0.0065 -0.0069 
 (-4.95***) (-3.55***) (-4.93***) (-3.54***) (-3.1***) (-2.44**) 
yr12 -0.5015 -0.4693 -0.4993 -0.4665 -0.0071 -0.0077 
 (-5.32***) (-3.27***) (-5.3***) (-3.25***) (-3.46***) (-2.46**) 
yr13 -0.5212 -0.4760 -0.5189 -0.4733 -0.0066 -0.0069 
 (-5.64***) (-3.41***) (-5.62***) (-3.39***) (-3.1***) (-2.33**) 
yr14 -0.6935 -0.6382 -0.6903 -0.6340 -0.0088 -0.0091 
 (-6.1***) (-3.69***) (-6.08***) (-3.66***) (-3.51***) (-2.52**) 
constant -3.5397 -2.3218 -3.5293 -2.3259 0.4566 0.4740 
 (-11.23***) (-2.35*) (-11.21***) (-2.35**) (61.2***) (21.86***) 
R-Squared 0.6113 0.5259 0.612 0.5269 0.6203 0.55 
F-Statistics 20.67*** 114.48*** 20.77 112.27 12.33 99.69 
H-Statistics 0.3229 0.2288 0.3239 0.2288 0.0022 0.0021 
  Number of Observation    333  333  333  333  333  333   
 
The dependent  variable,  lnTINT  is the natural  log of total interest  income  of banks in the 
countries  under  the analysis.  ; lnTREV  is the natural  log of total  revenue  and lnROA  is a proxy 
measure of bank profitability computed as a natural log of profit after tax divided by total assets. 
Meanwhile,  the independent  variables,  lnPL is a proxy measure  of price of labor calculated  as the 
natural log of personnel cost; lnPK is the proxy measure of price of capital, calculated as the natural 
log of overhead  expenses,  lnPF as the proxy  measure  of price  of loanable  fund, calculated  as the 
natural log for the Ratio of annual interest expenses to total loanable funds; lnTA is a proxy measure 
of size, calculated as the natural log of total banks assets; lnEQUITYTA is a measure of bank 
capitalization, calculated as the natural log shareholders equity divided by the total assets; 
lnLOANLOSSTA  is a measure of bank credit risk calculated as a natural log of the ratio of total loan 
loss provisions divided by total assets; lnLOANTA is used as a proxy measure of loans intensity, 
calculated as the natural log of total loans divided by total assets. H-statistics is computed based on the 
total coefficients of the three input variables, the lnPF, lnPK and lnPL. E-statistics is the scores based 
on the three input variables in the long run equilibrium test. The t-statistics values are in parentheses. 
A constant is included but not reported. (***) indicates significance at the 1% level, while (**) and (*) 
indicate significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for Malaysia indicates that panel data is more 
suitable than the pool data. Thus, random effect is used rather than the OLS. Further analysis using the 
Haussmann Test show that fixed effect model is best for all three specification models. Values in 
parenthesis  are the t-statistics.  Symbols  ***, ** and * denote significance  at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.  Year 1 to Year 14 denotes 1996 to 2009. For the time effect test, year 3 (1998) 
pooled and fixed effect test were omitted due to collinearity. 
 The variable total loan and advances to total asset (lnLOANTA) used to capture for the liquidity 
level of Malaysian banks, showed a positive sign and highly significant at 1% level. For a one unit 
increase in total revenue, total loan and advances to total asset was expected to increase by 27 percent, 
holding all other variables constant. The high loan ratio was associated to the loan policy practiced by the 
Malaysian financial institutions. Banking institutions, as part of the lending institutions, offered loans and 
advances to the consumers and thus, were affected due to these activities. In relation to the HHI result, the 
higher amounts of loan significantly contributed to the higher amount of total interest income and total 
revenue for the banks in Malaysia. 
 
Another test conducted was based on the Panzar-Rosse model. This was to see how the Malaysian 
banks perform in the long run equilibrium. The equilibrium position in the banking industry was assessed 
by estimating the equation with return on asset (lnROA) as a dependent variable. In the long run 
equilibrium model, price of labor is positively correlated with return on asset but negative for the price of 
capital and price of fund. All of these input prices are not significant. The coefficient of the total asset 
variable is positive but not significant with a minimal elasticity of 0.0008. This suggests that size-induced 
differences between banks may lead to higher total revenue per unit of assets and that larger banks seem 
to be more efficient compared to smaller banks in the long run. Having an added advantage of having 
larger asset, the banks can reap economies of scale in the long term based on efficient and productive 
used of asset. Similar positive sign are found for lnEQUITYTA and lnLOANTA. On the other hand, 
looking at the risk indicator, the lnLOANLOSSTA had a negative elasticity of 0.5891 and highly 
significant at 1% level in the long equilibrium estimation. 
 
11.0 Conclusion 
 
Bank concentration can also influence the cost of intermediation (Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
1999; Demirgüc-Kunt et al, 2003; Naceur and Kandil, 2009, etc). A higher degree of concentration in the 
banking industry enables banks to increase their lending rate and hence the cost of intermediation. 
 
The concentration result showed that Asian banks were moving from high concentration to 
moderate concentration between 1996 to 2009. Malaysia had moderate concentration. Meanwhile,  the 
Herfindahl  Hirschman  Index  result  in  terms  total  assets  showed  Malaysia  banking  sectors  were 
moderately concentrated. When HHI was measured based on the total assets and total deposits, Malaysia 
showed a of moderately concentrated conditions. For total assets, the HHI graph for Malaysia showed an 
HHI of less than 1800. 
 
Taking market shares as weights and stressing the importance of larger banks by assigning them a 
greater weight than smaller banks, the result for Herfindahl Hirschman Index showed that Malaysian 
commercial banks are undergoing an increase of competition in a decreased rate -- in the category of 
moderately concentrated. 
 
The expected sign of market power, is undetermined but the expected relationship between 
operating expenses and net interest is positive according to the efficient-structure hypothesis (Naceur and 
Kandil, 2009). 
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